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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GARY MUGLESTON, by his Guard-
ian ad litem, KENNETH MUGLES-
TON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EMIL R. GLAITTLI, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7676 
BRIEF OF APPELL~T 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This suit was brought by the respondent, Gary Mugleston, 
by his guardian ad litem, Kenneth lvfugleston, against the 
appellant, Emil R. Glaittli, to recover damages for personal 
injuries sustained by the respondent as the result of the ap.: 
pellant' s minor son driving an automobile in which the re-
spondent was a passenger, v1hich said automobile, on a sharp 
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turn went off the highway- and into the bar pit on the 13th 
day of September, 1950, wherein judgment was rendered in 
favor of the respondent and against the appellant for the sum 
of Three Hundred ( $300.00) and costs, by reason of which 
this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Upon the niglit in question the appellant and his wife 
left their home at 225 Paxton Avenue, in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
in company with another couple and went to a picture show 
in the automobile of the other couple. There were several 
youngsters around the place at the time the appellant and 
wife left the home with the other party, at w~ich time one 
of the youngsters suggested that they all get in the truck and 
go for a ride, which was agreed, and the son of the appellant 
got in the truck under the . wheel and started out for a ride. 
They went west on 17th South, and when they arrived a~ a 
sharp turn at the end of 17th South and into 4th West, the 
son of appellant lost control of the car and it went off the road 
and caused the injury to the plaintiff. It appears that before 
leaving home the appellant warned his son to leave the cars 
alone except to drive them in the garage, and particularly 
advised him that he should not get any funny ideas and attempt 
to take the_ cars out on the street. Out of this situation the 
injured boy, through his guardian ad litem, brought a suit 
against the appellant, the father of the boy who took his 
-father's car with the ~ther children in it including the respond· 
ent, after his father and n1other had gone to a picture show 
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and after the father, appellant herein, specifically directed him 
not to take the car out on the street and attetnpt to drive it. 
Upon this statement of facts this action arose. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH 
APPELLANT RELIES 
Point 1. ~'as the appellant in any way responsible for the 
injury to the respondent, and under the circumstances that 
existed, can appellant be charged with negligence that would 
support a judgment against him? 
Point 2. Is a parent, in his absence, and who has not 
directed the son to use the automobile on the specific occasion 
in question, nor consented to its use, responsible t~ a third 
party (the respondent herein) for an in jury to such third party ? 
Point 3. Can a party who is a guest passenger in an auto-
mobile recover for damages sustained by him without charging 
intoxication or willful misconduct as the proximate cause of 
such injury or damage, and establishing such allegation by 
competent proof against the party charged? 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. Was the appellant in any way responsible 
for the injury to the respondent, and under the circumstances 
that existed, can appellant be charged with negligence that 
\Vould support a judgment against him? 
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This point largely covers the situation before us. There 
is no dispute about the facts of the case, that is, that the minor 
son of the appellant was driving the automobile and that while 
so doing, the respondent was injured, but is the injury he 
suffered chargeable to the appellant? 
Having come into this case after the same was tried and 
judgment entered, it is just a little difficult to understand why 
the judgment was entered, as the evidence shows that before 
the father and mother left the home that night the father said 
to the boy, ( CT ake and drive the cars in and don't get any ideas 
of going out with them. We will be back after awhile." That 
shortly after the father and mother left, he stated, ccw e got in 
the truck and went after we talked it over. We had already 
had things planned the time they were starting to go." Tran-
script, Page 57. 
Perhaps the Court had 1n mind Section 57-4-26 of the 
1943 revised statutes which states as follows: 
((Every owner of a motor vehicle causing or know-
ingly permitting a minor under the age of eighteen 
years to drive such vehicle upon a highway, and any 
person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to such 
minor, shall be jointly and severally liable for such 
minor and any damages caused by the negligence of 
such minor in driving such vehicle.'' 
Also Section 67-4-31, sub-section (a) : 
((No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a 
motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to 
be driven by any person who has no legal right to 
do so in violation of any provisions of this Act." 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ho\vever, I cannot. believe that the Court could have fol-
lowed these sections, as to the provision, ((causing or knowingly 
permitting." Certainly there is no evidence in this record to 
support the fact that the father either knew, caused or know-
ingly permitted the boy to take the car on to the highway. In 
fact, the evidence is just contrary to such a proposition. 
From going into the cases upon the facts in this case we 
find that the overwhelming weight of authority is contrary to 
a judgment in this case as against the father, the defendant 
herein. 
I first refer to ~9 American Jurisprl.i.dence, Page 691, 
which recites as follows: 
((The parent is not liable merely because the child 
lives at home with him, works for him, and is under 
his care, management, and control. Rather, liability 
exists, apart from the parent's own negligence, only 
where t..lJe tortious act is done by the child as the ser-
vant or agent of the parent, or _where the act is con-
sented to or ratified by the parent. The rule that the 
parent is not liable holds true whether he is present 
or absent when the tort of the chi] d is committed.'' 
In 5 American Jurisprudence, page 701, Section 369 
under automobiles we quote the following: 
(tin order, however, to hold the parent liable on the 
theory of responsibility under a doctrine of respondeat 
superior, a child must have been acting upon the scope 
of his employment. Even conceding the existence 
of an agency or master and servant relationship, the 
parent cannot be held responsible for an act of the 
duld while engaged in some private matter of his own, 
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unleSs- the parent, · with full knowledge ·of the facts, 
ratifies the act of the child. The question of liability, 
if any, in cases where there may be an issue of fact 
as to the nature of the mission in which the child may 
be engaged by other than his or her personal ends and 
pleasure and is to be determined upon the facts of each 
particular case." 
In the case of Schafer vs. Osterbrink, 30 Northwestern 
922 at page 925 it holds that: 
nln order to charge the father, defendant Everhart, 
with the consequences of Henry's negligence, it must 
appear from the evidence satisfactorily to your minds 
that the relation between them of master and servant 
existed at the time; that Henry was the servant of his 
father; and that the negligent acts of Henry were com-
mitted in the line of his employment as such servant. 
And again it is undisputed that the defendants were, 
at the time, father and son, and that the son was a 
minor. This relation does not of its own, render the 
father liable· for the wrongful conduct of the son." 
Referring to Stumpf vs. Montgomery, 226 Pacific, page 
65, we find the following: 
celt is conceded that there is no liability on a parent 
as such for the tort of a child. The liability of a parent 
for the act of a minor child rests upon the basic facts 
. as a liability of the master for the acts of a servant. 
celt is well settled that even though the driver of a car 
is a servant of the owner of the car, the owner is not 
liable unless at the time of the accident the driver was 
acting. within the scope of his authority in regards 
to his master's business.'' (Citing numerous cases) . 
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The case of McFarlane vs. Winters, Utah Case 155 P 437, 
holds as follows: 
HWe have carefully read the evidence which is pre-
served in a bill of exceptions, and we have been unable 
to arrive at the conclusion that, under the facts and 
circumstances disclosed by the evidence, the father, 
under the law, can be held responsible for the acts of 
the son, which acts the jury found caused the accident 
and the consequential injuries and damages as before 
stated. It conclusively appeared from . the evidence 
that Dr. Winters was not present at the time and place 
of the accident, and therefore had no control over the 
son in driving and managing the automobile, and that 
he knew nothing concerning the accident until after 
it had occurred. The plaintiff, however, sought to 
establish . the doctor's liability upon the theory that 
the automobile was owned by him, that it had thereto-
fore been driven by the son in the father's business af-
fairs, and that at the time of the accident it was being 
driven by the son in the father's affairs. In other 
words, the plaintiff seeks to hold the father responsible 
for the acts of the son upon the theory of principal and 
agent or that of master and servant. All the evidence 
produced by the plaintiff relating to the question now 
under consideration is in substance; as follows: the 
plaintiff and the last two of his witnesses testified that 
they knew of the automobile in question; that it was 
owned by Dr. Winters, and that he used it in his busi-
ness of practicing medicine; that prior to the accident 
they, on several occasions, had seen the son driving the 
car, both when the doctor was in it and when other 
members of his family were in the car with the son 
. . . . It will be observed that from plaintiff's evidence 
in the case it was made to appear that the automobile 
in question was, in fact, in the possession and under 
the control of Glen Winters, the son, so that what must 
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·be. inferred in this case is that Glen was the servant 
or agent of his father and was engaged in the latter's 
business affairs at the time and place of the accident. 
Can such an inference be legitimately deduced from 
the mere fact that Glen was at the time driving an 
automobile owned by his father? Is not the inference 
just as nah1ral and quite as strong that Glen was driving 
the automobile either for his own use or for the use 
of someone other than the father . . . . It is certainly 
going to what we consider, undue lengths to hold that, 
because an automobile or any other vehicle or instru-
mentality is shown to be owned by one person, but is 
found in the· possession and use of another, the only 
legitimate inference to be deduced from such fact is 
that such other person is the agent or servant of the 
owner, and is using the instrumentality in the O\rner's 
business affairs or for his use and benefit . . . in this 
case judgment was entered against the minor son and 
'vas withheld against the father, owner of the auto-
mobile. 
In the case of Watkins vs. Clark, Kansas Case, 176 Pacific, 
page 131, which was an action for damages for personal in-
juries which the plaintiff suffered in an automobile accident: 
nA demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence was sus-
tained and he appeals ... In this case the father was 
charged with negligence in permitting his daughter 
to operate the family car which resulted in the injury. 
The demurrer to the evidence was properly sustained. 
There was neither admission nor evidence to submit 
to the jury proving prima facie or otherwise, or tending 
to prove that the defendant's daughter was acting for 
him as agent, or servant, or in any other representative 
-.capacity., or under his direction or control, or in any 
joint enterprise from which agency might be implied. 
10 
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HThe automobile was not a dangerous instrumen· 
tality \Yhich the defendant let loose in the community. 
The automobile was not a guilty agent in the accident, 
bringing punishment on the owner, like the deodands 
of English law. Management by the driver was the 
cause of the accident.', 
The case of Knight vs. Gossitt was a case of joint owner· 
ship of an automobile between the father and his 23-year-old 
son. An accident occurred while the son was driving, the son 
being on his own busines, held, that the evidence was not suf · 
ficient to establish the relation of master and servant between 
the father and the son. 
In the case of Boling vs. Asbridge, 203 Pacific 894, it is 
held as follows: 
c c In presenting the second assignrnent of error counsel 
do not seem to disagree upon the general principal 
that, when the plaintiff in an action seeks to charge the 
owner of an automobile with liability for an in jury 
inflicted by the car while it was being operated by an-
·other, the burden is on the plaintiff not only to show 
that an injury \vas the proximate result of the negligence 
of the operator, but also that such person was the serv-
ant or agent of the defendant, and was at the time of 
such negligence, acting within the scope of his em-
ployment. Quoting Berry on automobiles, 68 3.'' 
Quoting from the case of Smith vs. Jordan, Massachusetts, 
97 Northeastern 761: 
"Where a father was possessed of an automobile 
which he kept upon his premises, and his daughter, 
about 19 years of age, was accustomed to drive it and 
did so whenever she felt like it, asking permission 
11 
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to use it when the father was at home, and when not 
at home took it sometimes without permission, there 
being no proof that the daughter was actually employed 
by the father to operate the machine, held, in an action 
against the father, where the daughter, in using the 
machine for her own pleasure in driving her personal 
friends, negligently injured a person in the highway, 
that such proof was not sufficient to constitute the 
daughter the servant or agent of the master, and that 
a motion for a direction of a verdict for the defendant 
should have prevailed." 
In the case of Blair vs. Broadcaster, Virginia, 93 South-
eastern, page 632, it is held: 
tcThe principals of law which govern this case are 
plain. A father is not liable for the torts of his minor 
son, simply because of paternity. There must exist an 
authority from the father to the son to do the tortuous 
act, or a subsequent ratification and adoption of it, 
before responsibility attaches to the parent. The 
wrongful act must be performed by the son in per-
formance of the business, incident, or undertaking 
authorized bv the father before the latter can be held 
liable. If th~ act is not done by the son in furtherance 
of the father's business, but in performance of some 
individual design of his own the father is not liable. 
The controlling rules of law are the same, whether the 
business in question concerns the operation of an auto-
bile or any other matter." 
In the case of Parker vs. Wilson, Alabama Case 60 South-
ern, page 150, it is held: 
tCGeneral principals of law governing the case are 
more or less familiar. The mere fact of paternity 
does not make the father liable for the torts- of his 
12 
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minor child .... a strict relation of master and servant 
invariably arises out of contract express or implied. 
It involves an agreement by the servant to do something 
for the master and the master's liability to strangers 
for the negligence of his servant is founded upon the 
argument that he controls the manner of the perform-
ance of the thing to be done. As to third persons 
the minor child may become by particular arrangement 
the servant of the father, and this without agreement 
for compensation; but the relation of father and child 
has never of itself sufficed that the common law, pre-
vailing in this state, to make the child a servant of the 
father within the meaning of the rule of respondeat 
superior, or to impose upon the. parent liability for 
torts committed without his knowledge or authority. 
29 Cyc. 1665. 
"The parents' responsibility in such case is governed 
by the ordinary principals affecting the liability of a. 
principal for the act of his agent or a master for his 
servant." 
While there are numerous cases supporting the proposi-
tions set forth in the cases cited, we do not deem it adviseable 
to extend the quotations upon the principal involved. 
That the cases cited do not support, but· are in direct op-
position to the judgment entered against the appellant in this 
case. 
It naturally follows that the answer to Point Two, to-wit: 
Point Two. Is a parent, in his absence and who has not 
directed the son to use the automobile on the specific occasion 
in question nor consented to its use, respo~sible to a third party 
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From the cases referred to above we submit that Point 
Two must be answered in the negative, that is, that the parent 
is not responsible for the injury to the plaintiff herein under 
the circumstances involved in the case. 
Our next point in question is Point Three: Can a party who 
is a guest passenger in an automobile recoyer for damages sus-
tained by him without charging nintoxication or willful mis-
conduct," as the proximate cause of such injury or damage and 
establishing such allegation by competent proof against the 
party charged? 
This point refers to the statutory provision respecting guest 
passengers. There is not any question but that the plaintiff 
in this action was a guest passenger in the automobile from 
which he received the injury complained of. We have Section 
57-11-7 of .Revised Statutes of Utah 1943, which we refer to, 
ccResponsibility of ovlner or driver of a vehicle to guest." 
· CCAny person who, as a guest, accepts a ride in any 
vehicle moving upon any of the public highways of 
the State of Utah, and while so riding as such guest 
receives or sustains an injury, shall have no right of 
recovery against the owner or driver or any person 
responsible for the operation of such vehicle . . . . If 
such person so riding as a guest be a minor and sustain 
an injury or be killed or die as a result of injury sus-
tained while so riding as such guest, then neither the 
parents nor guardians, nor the estate not legal repre-
sentatives or heirs of such minor shall have any right 
of recovery against the driver or owner or person re-
sponsible for the operation of said vehicle for injury 
sustained or as a result of the death of such minor.~· 
It follows in the section that if the owner or driver or person 
., .. 14 
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is responsible for the operation of the vehicle while intoxi-
cated or guilty of willful. misconduct, then such person can 
be held. 
The Complaint neither charges the operator of the car 
with intoxication or willful misconduct, although the complaint 
in Paragraph One designates the plaintiff as a guest in the auto-
mobile. While it, is true that the Complaint does not cover 
this guest statute, ¢.e Answer in its first defense alleges that 
the Complaint fails to state a claim against defendant upon 
which relief can be granted, so I am assuming that the question 
here was involved in the case, at least if not, the pleading in the 
Answer _raises this question in the paragraph just above quoted, 
and if the Court did not make a finding in accordance therewith 
he should have done, as the point is certainly involved in the/ 
. · Fl"'SWtY 
of the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
We therefore submit that the Court erred in his Finding 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree entered in the above 
entitled case, and that the same should be reversed by this 
Court and returned to the District Court with an order directing 
said Court to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff of no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIELDS & SHIELDS, 
Attorneys for Defend,tnt and 
Appellant 
405 Felt Building , 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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